We agree with the district court that the Schlegels failed to produce substantial evidence of damage to reputation.As for this damage issue, the Courier assumes, as we do, that Richard is a private figure.
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at 3010, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809 (holding that public officials and public figures must prove actual malice regarding defamatory statements about them as for speech concerning private figures, states were left free to interpret their own law and apply any level of protection short of strict liability). Contrary to the district court's findings, the Courier has contended throughout these proceedings that Richard is a public figure and for that reason had to prove actual malice. See Jones, 440 N.W.2d at 889 (holding that private figure need only prove negligence in defamation action against news media defendant). We begin our discussion by first assuming without deciding that Richard is a private figure and was therefore only required to prove the Courier was negligent in publishing the incorrect report. For example, in Johnson, we said that "o recover in an action for defamation, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove some sort of cognizable injury, such as injury to reputation." 542 N.W.2d at 513 see also Lara, 512 N.W.2d at 785 (noting that "the gist of an action for libel or slander is the publication of written or oral statements which tend to injure a person's reputation and good name") Prosser Keeton § 111, at 773. Our own cases are consistent with this theme that defamation is based upon damage to the plaintiff's reputation.In contrast, if a statement is libelous per quod, the plaintiff must prove damage to reputation and consequently any special damages such as mental anguish. The existence of damage to reputation is conclusively presumed from the publication of the libel. Thus, the jury is allowed to award substantial damages without the necessity of the plaintiff proving actual damage to reputation. When statements are libelous per se, they are actionable in and of themselves without proof of malice, falsity, or damage.Libel is generally a written publication of defamatory matter, and slander is generally an oral publication of such matter. Page Keeton, Prosser Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111, at 771 (5th ed. The law of defamation includes the twin torts of libel and slander. In case of statements that are libelous per se, damages for mental anguish or hurt feelings are allowed because damage to reputation is presumed. In case of statements that are not libelous per se but libelous per quod, this means a plaintiff must first prove actual damage to reputation before the plaintiff can recover for mental anguish or hurt feelings. As Prosser Keeton points out, "efamation is not concerned with the plaintiff's own humiliation, wrath, or sorrow, except as an element of 'parasitic' damages attached to an independent cause of action." Prosser Keeton § 111, at 771 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander §§ 386, 387 (1995).Defamation law protects interests of personality, not of property. A cause of action for defamation is based on the transmission of derogatory statements, not on any physical or emotional distress to plaintiff which may result. It is reputation which is defamed, reputation which is injured, and reputation which is protected by the law of defamation.ĭefamation is an impariment of a relational interest it denigrates the opinion which others in the community have of the plaintiff and invades the plaintiffs interest in the reputation and good name. The gravamen or gist of an action for defamation is damage to the plaintiff's reputation. An action for defamation or slander is based upon a violation of this right. He law of defamation embodies the public policy that individuals should be free to enjoy their reputation unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks. Libel per quod simply means that one must refer to facts or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation. Some examples of libel per se statements include an attack on the integrity and moral character of a party or an accusation that a person is a liar. Libel per se includes statements that have "a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse." Id. Narrowing our discussion to libel, we note there are two types of libel: libel per se and libel per quod.
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